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TOWARDS A UNITED KINGDOM
BILL OF RIGHTSt
Francis G. Jacobs*
The United Kingdom has no fundamental constitutional instrument. It is in that respect almost unique. Instead it has a
fundamental constitutional doctrine: the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. The first paradox of the United Kingdom
constitution is that no rules have a constitutional status.
The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty entails that all the
constitutional rules that, in other countries, would be set out in
a constitution are, in the United Kingdom, contained in Acts of
Parliament-or in the common law, or in unwritten constitutional conventions or custom; and that any such rules, whether
statutory or not, can be repealed or amended by an ordinary Act
of Parliament, with no special procedure and no special majority
being required. No provisions have constitutional status; still
less are any provisions entre.nched. There is no "fundamental
law."
Yet the notion of fundamental law was deeply rooted in England and, as Corwin showed in his classic survey,1 inspired much
constitutional thinking in the United States. It was the Revolution of 1688, establishing the supremacy of Parliament over the
Crown, which made it politically impossible for the courts to review Acts of Parliament. Political continuity and stability since
1688 have obviated the need for any new constitutional settlement. In France a century later the Revolution made judicial review politically impossible and that legacy has remained. Indeed,
judicial review of legislation is generally a rare and recent development throughout Europe.
Although now composed of three principal jurisdictions or
"law districts," namely England and Wales, Scotland, and
Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom remains a unitary State,
with for almost all purposes a single final court .of appeal, the
House of Lords. Any mention of the House of Lords as the final
t Thomas M. Cooley Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan Law School on
Nov. 2, 1983.
* Professor of European Law, University of London.
l. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928).
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court of appeal recalls that other familiar paradox, that the
United Kingdom is, politically, to some extent, a unitary State,
never entirely embracing the separation of powers which a
French observer found in the English Constitution2 and which
became the basis of the United States Constitution.
The formal and rigid separation of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of the state has, in any event, had very
different consequences in different settings: in France, it has
been taken, for nearly 200 years, to preclude the development of
the judicial review of legislation, while in the United States, for
almost as long, it has largely been accepted as requiring it. In
the United Kingdom the convention was established only in the
last century that the House of Lords, sitting in a judicial capacity, should be composed exclusively of judges. Even today the
Lord Chancellor can and frequently does sit, personifying, as a
leading member of both the legislature and the executive, the
rejection of the principle of the separation of powers.
Apart from such colourful anomalies, the most significant aspect of the rejection of the separation of powers is the predominance of Parliament, founded on a further paradox. The country
which can claim to be the home of the idea of fundamental law
now has as the cardinal principle of its unwritten constitution-a principle incompatible with a normal constitution, indeed almost the negation of the very idea of a constitution-the
principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. This Parliament is
not a legislature constrained by a system of checks and balances
with the executive branch. Given the predominance of the
House of Commons, the system of Cabinet Government, and the
extent of party discipline, resulting in the executive exercising
control over the legislature, parliamentary sovereignty reflects
the sovereignty not of the legislature but of an executive periodically answerable to the electorate, a system eloquently described
by the present Lord Chancellor as at least potentially an "elective dictatorship." 3
Parliamentary sovereignty means simply, in concrete terms,
that since the eighteenth century no court has claimed jurisdiction to review an Act of Parliament. Cracks in the monolithic
structure of the constitution have appeared only where some
quasi-federal element appears to threaten the unitary character
of the constitution.
A first example is the reverberations of apparently entrenched
2.
3.

MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS,

Book XI.

LORD HAILSHAM, THE ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIP (Dimbleby Lecture

1976).
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clauses-and by entrenched I mean protected against amendment by subsequent legislation-in the Treaty of Union between
England and Scotland• that in 1707 effected the union of the
two countries and of their parliaments. As a Scottish court noted
thirty years ago, 11 there were some clauses in that Treaty of
Union which "expressly reserve to the Parliament of Great Britain powers of subsequent modification, and other clauses which
either contain no such power or emphatically exclude subsequent alteration by declaration that the provision shall be fundamental and unalterable in all time coming."6 But the court in
effect decided that no court exists, either in Scotland or in England, with jurisdiction to declare ineffective any conflicting
legislation.
Similarly the Union with Ireland Act 18007 presents apparently entrenched clauses. I take this less well known example
from a lecture by Lord Kilbrandon, chairman of the recent
Royal Commission on the Constitution. 8 (Yes, the Constitution
has been recognised to the extent of having a Royal Commission
to sit on it, although, as is commonly the case, very little has
been done to implement its recommendations. 9 )
Sec. I of the Union with Ireland Act 1800 provides that
"the said foregoing Articles are hereby declared to be the
Articles of Union of Great Britain and Ireland and the
same shall be in full force and have effect forever." Brave
words. Now let us look at the fate of one of the Articles.
It was enacted by Article 5 "that the Churches of England and Ireland as now by law established be united
into one Protestant Episcopal Church to be called the
United Church of England and Ireland and that the Doctrine Worship Discipline and Government of the said
United Church shall be and shall remain in full force for
ever, and that this be deemed and taken to be an essential and fundamental part of the Union." The main part
of this Article suffered painless and unlamented extinction at the hands of the Statute Law Revision Act 1953. 10
"So much," as the chairman of the Royal Commission on the
4.
5.

5 Anne, ch. 8.
MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 Sess. Cas. 396 (Scot. 1st Div.).
6. Id. at 411.
7. 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67.
8. LORD KILBRANDON, A BACKGROUND TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1975).
9. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1969-1973, REPORT (1973).
10. LORD KILBRANDON, supra note 8, at 16.
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Constitution succinctly put it, "for entrenched clauses." 11 Would
an enacted Bill of Rights suffer a similar fate?
The third example comes from a more recent move towards a
union, the accession of the United Kingdom to the European
Communities in 1973. The preamble to the Treaty establishing
the European Economic Community recites that the founding
member States were "determined to lay the foundations of an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." 12 While some
measure of economic integration has been achieved, the goal of
political union remains at least as remote as ever, yet economic
centralisation and the transfer of power to the Community institutions have had a perceptible impact on political and legal sovereignty. Indeed, it is now open to argument whether, in the
developing field CQvered by Community law, parliamentary sovereignty any longer constitutes the basic norm of the United
Kingdom constitution. 13
In the field of individual rights, the historic guarantees of
Magna Carta, 14 of the Petition of Right, 111 and of the Bill of
Rights 1689, 16 although still invoked occasionally by the courts,
have no constitutional status. Those historic documents may be,
and indeed to a considerable extent have been, repealed by subsequent Acts of Parliament.
The United Kingdom is a party to modern international bills
of rights: the European Convention on Human Rights,1 7 the European Social Charter, 18 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 and the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights. 20 The status of these bills of rights
remains precarious. One consequence of parliamentary sovereignty is that treaties ratified by the United Kingdom but not
incorporated do not have the force of law. Although the rights
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are, by
their very nature ideally suited to be enforced in the domestic
11. Id.
12. Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
13. See, e.g., Trindade, Parliamentary sovereignty and the primacy of European
Community law, 35 Moo. L. REV. 375 (1972); Winterton, The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary supremacy re-examined, 92 LAW Q. REV. 591 (1972).
14. 9 Hen. 3, chs. 1-37.
15. 3 Car., ch. 1.
16. 1 W. & M. (Sess. 2), ch. 2.
17. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
18. Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
19. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
20. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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courts, those instruments, in contrast to the Treaty of Rome,
have not been incorporated or given legislative effect, and so do
not have the force of law in the United Kingdom. This "dualist"
approach to treaties, while it can be given a democratic rationalisation, is perhaps the mark of an insular rather than an internationalist view of the law. It is true that, where a statute allows
for more than one interpretation, the courts profess to adopt, as
a rule of interpretation, that meaning which "is consonant with
the treaty obligations."21 (Courts support the approach with the
theory that they are giving effect to the intention of Parliament,
since Parliament can be presumed not to have intended to legislate inconsi!;ltently with a treaty obligation. But the theory can, I
shall suggest, be exposed as a legal fiction.) Nevertheless, that
rule of interpretation has, at least until very recently, had little
effect in relation to the European Convention. Instead, the
courts, accustomed to very detailed and elaborate legislation,
have said that the Convention provisions are "too vague," "too
general," "not the kind of thing we are accustomed to." 22 The
result is that, while the courts will resist statutory encroachments on the fundamental rights protected by the common law,
they are less disposed to give effect to the Convention.
The common law remains, therefore, the principal safeguard
of individual rights in the United Kingdom, but the common law
too must yield to the express terms of an Act of Parliament.
Historically, it could reasonably be argued that the fundamental
rights of United Kingdom citizens were more effectively protected by the common law than they were in other systems by
codes, catalogues of rights, or legislation. But the fact that the
United Kingdom is now the first client in Strasbourg23 suggests
that the position has changed. Several factors may have caused
this change. First, other systems may construe fundamental
rights more broadly and define permissible limitations more
strictly now than they are construed and defined in England.
Second, ever-growing encroachments of the legislature and the
executive create new threats to human rights. Third, the English
courts are less ready to develop new remedies to meet those
threats.
The right of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of associ21. Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, (1967] 2 Q.B. 116, 143 (C.A.
1966) (Diplock, L.J.).
22. Ostreicher v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1978] 1 All E.R. 591 (Q.B.
1977), aff'd, (1978) 1 W.L.R. 810 (C.A.).
23. In recent years, more applications have been brought against the United Kingdom than any other State. See CouNCIL OF EUROPE Doc. DH (83) 6.
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ation, the right to freedom of the press, the presumption against
retroactive penal legislation, the presumption that legislation
does not intend to take property without compensation, all these
rights (recognised, incidentally, by the European Convention)
are protected in England only by the common law, which remains subject to any statutory inroads. Sufficiently explicit legislation can abrogate any of these rights. Similarly, the right to
freedom of the person and the famous remedy of habeas corpus
originated in the common law, but habeas corpus is now largely
regulated by statute and the right to freedom of the person can
at any time be abridged by statute. For example, the Police and
Evidence Bill 24 proposed to increase from twenty-four hours to
in some cases thirty-six and in exceptional cases ninety-six hours
the period during which a person can be detained without
charge. No common law rights are immune from Parliament.
Against that background the scene shifts-or rather the camera pans back-to Europe.' In recent years, United Kingdom law
and institutions have a new dimension, the European dimension.
Constitutionally and legally, the United Kingdom is now for the
first time part of a Western European polity. Lord Justice
Scarman recognised this development in his far-sighted lectures
English Law-the New Dimension in 1974, the starting point of
the recent debate on the adoption of a Bill of Rights in the
United Kingdom.u That European dimension has two aspects:
the European Community, which the United Kingdom joined in
1973, and the European Convention on Human Rights, now beginning to have a profound impact on the United Kingdom. The
European Communities Act 1972 gives effect to European Community law in the United Kingdom, however, while the Convention remains in a legal limbo.
Yet the United Kingdom Government participated actively in
the drafting of the Convention, was one of the original signato24.
25.

Now the Police and Evidence Act 1984.
L. ScARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION

(1974). For the continuation of
(1975); P. WALLINGTON & J. McBRIDE,
AND A BILL OF RIGHTS (1976); HOME DEPARTMENT, LEGISLATION ON
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (1976);

the debate, see M. ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS?
CIVIL LIBERTIES
HUMAN RIGHTS

STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BY LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 64-74 (1977); Fawcett, A Bill of Rights for the United
Kingdom?, 1 HuM. RTs. REv. 57 (1976); Brown, A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom?, 58 THE PARLIAMENTARIAN 79 (1977); Mann, Britain's Bill of Rights, 94 LAW Q.
REV. 512 (1978); N. ANDERSON, LIBERTY, LAW AND JUSTICE (1978); Do WE NEED A BILL OF
RIGHTS? (C. Campbell ed. 1980); Riedel, 'J'he Bill of Rights Fallacy, in IN MEMORIAM
J.D.B. MITCHELL 38 (1983). For earlier discussion, see Mann, The United Kingdom's Bill
of Rights, 122 NEw L.J. 289 (1972); Black, Is There Already a British Bill of Rights?, 89
LAW Q. REV. 173 (1973).
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ries in 1950, and was the first state to ratify the Convention in
1951. The Convention served as a model for the constitutions
that the United Kingdom drew up for its colonies when they attained independence, as the Constitution of Nigeria and thereafter the independence constitutions of many Commonwealth
countries demonstrate. (I do not refer here to the United States
in 1776.) With the understandable exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom was the first of the big
European countries to take the then bold step in 1966 of accepting the competence of the Commission and the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. But it has never legislated to give effect to the Convention in the United Kingdom. For some years,
such inactivity could be viewed indulgently. The Convention, after all, guaranteed only certain elementary rights which were adequately protected by the common law, with its centuries of individualistic and libertarian tradition. 26 The Convention was an
export model, with left-hand drive, suitable for the European
continent and perhaps for the former colonies.
Such complacency should have had some limits even at the
outset. For instance, the right to privacy, protected by Article 8
of the Convention, provides one example of a right that has
never been protected adequately by the common law or by statute, as the recent case of Malone well shows. 27 With the development of the case-law of the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights, however, the contention that incorporation is
unnecessary becomes increasingly hard to sustain. Time and
again, in recent years, changes have been made in English law
and practice to comply with opinions of the Commission and
judgments of the Court: changes in the prison rules; in immigration procedures; in legislation on contempt of court; on mental
health; on trade unions; on homosexual relations; on corporal
punishment in schools. 28 In at least some of these cases, legislation might not have been necessary and the cases might not
have reached Strasbourg if the Convention had been given legislative force in the United Kingdom. Other cases might have
been resolved in accord with the Convention, even without incorporation, if the courts and the authorities had taken full account of their obligations under the Convention when applying
26.

Cf.

THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF

13

SEPTEMBER

1966

TO THE RE-

QUEST OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE
OF THE CONVENTION, CouNCIL OF EUROPE Doc. H

27.
28.

(69) 9,

57

Second Addendum.

Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No.

2), 1979

Ch.

344.

For some examples, see A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVEN-

TION IN DOMESTIC LAW

186-87 (1983).
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domestic legislation.
Admittedly, the United Kingdom is not by any means unique
in its failure to adopt legislation to give effect to the Convention.
The Convention has the status of domestic law in only twothirds of the twenty-one states party to the Convention. The
seven parties where the Convention does not have the status of
domestic law are the four Scandinavian countries (Denmark,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden), Ireland, Malta and the United
Kingdom. 29
Perhaps this political reality influenced the European Court of
Human Rights to hold, despite strong evidence to the contrary
in the Convention's negotiating history, that the Convention itself imposes no obligation to incorporate the Convention into
domestic law. Article 1 of the Convention provides that "the
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention," but in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom 30 the
Court was prepared to hold only that:
[B]y substituting the words "shall secure" for the words
"undertake to secure" in the text of Article 1, the drafters of the Convention also intended to make it clear that
the rights and freedoms set out in Section I would be directly secured to anyone within the jurisdiction of the
Contracting States. That intention finds a particularly
faithful reflection in those instances where the Convention has been incorporated into domestic law. 31
Yet, as I shall try to demonstrate, to be fully effective, implementation of the Convention does require some form of
incorporation.
In recent years, and notably since the Scarman lectures of
197 4, 32 there has been a growing interest in the idea of giving
statutory force to the Convention. Each of the main political
parties has at various times expressed approval of the idea. A
succession of bills to incorporate the Convention has been introduced in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. One
such bill successfully completed all the steps in the House of
Lords and led to the appointment of a Select Committee to investigate the question. Only the narrowest majority of the di29.
30.
31.
32.

For a full survey, see A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights).
Id. at 103 (footnotes omitted).
L. ScARMAN, supra note 25.
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vided Committee favoured adoption of a Bill of Rights, although
it was unanimous in the view that, if there were to be a Bill of
Rights, it should be based on the European Convention. 33 The
bill 34 which passed through the House of Lords made no headway in the Commons, the Government of the day being unwilling to make government time available to consider the bill.
Within the past ten years, however, without formal incorporation, the Convention has taken faltering steps towards judicial
recognition. An English court first invoked the Convention in
1974. 36 There it merely reinforced the presumption that criminal
legislation does not have retroactive effect. Since then, the attitudes of the judges toward the Convention have been divided
and ambivalent in a variety of contexts, notably immigration
cases. 36 The judicial dicta reveal this division and ambivalence.
For example, Lord Denning, having once expressed the view that
immigration officers should take account of the Convention in
applying the immigration rules, 37 subsequently recanted and
stated that because immigration officers had a difficult enough
task "they cannot be expected to know or to apply the Convention. They must go simply by the immigration rules laid down
by the Secretary of State and not by the Convention. " 38 The
full, chequered story of judicial recognition is an unhappy one.
Every step forward by one judge is echoed by a judge who dissociates himself from that step. 39
Has the time not come for the courts to adopt a more robust
approach in place of this delicate two-step? My thesis is that the
courts could, without the need for any further legislation, and
should, without greatly departing from existing principles, go far
beyond their timid advances and embrace the Convention
33. HOUSE OF LORDS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON A BILL OF RIGHTS 39-40
(1978). For a different view, see J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS 277-81 (1980).
34. L. Wade, Introducing a Bill of Rights, in Do WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS?, supra
note 25, at 17. Previous attempts to introduce legislation had been made in 1970 and
1975. See J. JACONELLI, supra note 33, at 32, 259-61.
35. Waddington v. Miah, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683 (H.L.).
36. Compare Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Phansopkar,
1976 Q.B. 606, 626 (C.A. 1975) (Scarman, L.J.) (affirming that courts have a duty to
resolve ambiguities or omissions to give effect to or not derogate the Convention) with
Regina v. Chief Immigration Officer ex parte Salamat Bibi, [1976] 3 All E.R. 843, 847
(C.A.) (Denning, M.R.) (affirming that the Convention is not a part of English law because not incorporated by legislative action).
37. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Bhajan Singh, 1976
Q.B. 198, 207 (C.A. 1975) (Denning, M.R.).
38. Regina v. Chief Immigration Officer ex parte Salamat Bibi, [1976] 3 All E.R. 843,
847 (C.A.) (Denning, M.R.).
39. See Duffy, English law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585 (1980).
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whole-heartedly, even if they cannot give the Convention the
special status accorded to Community law by the European
Communities Act.
Among the principal reasons for taking this view is a very recent but very compelling one, the emergence in recent years of a
coherent and systematic body of case-law developed by the European Court of Human Rights. A series of judgments in the
past three or four years is particularly striking. The Court, after
a cautious early approach, adopted a dynamic view of the Convention, taking a broad and flexible attitude to the rights guaranteed and a systematically restrictive interpretation of the
Convention's limitations clauses. If such statements were unconvincing before, domestic courts should now often find it impossible to say that the provisions of the Convention are "vague" or
too imprecise to be of assistance. The Convention is, in this respect, unlike any other treaty to which the United Kingdom is a
party. Under international law, it falls to the states which are
parties to an agreement, in the absence of a procedure for judicial settlement, to interpret their treaty obligations for themselves. Where the judicial process is available, however, independent and authoritative interpretation of the court must prevail
over the unilateral view of each State. This principle also makes
possible an evolving interpretation of the treaty, an interpretation that accords with current conditions. The interpretation of
the Community Treaties by the Court of Justice suggests itself
as a parallel, the only similar case. But the resemblance ends, for
the United Kingdom, in the fact that the European Communities Act grants statutory force to the decisions of the Court of
Justice. 40 No such statutory provision exists for decisions of the
Court of Human Rights. The Convention is thus unique.
It is not possible, I think, to argue that the Court of Human
Rights does not give an "authentic" interpretation of the Convention I?ut merely rules on whether the State concerned has infringed the Convention. Admittedly, the Court's decisions have
no automatic "direct effect" within the domestic legal systems;
this is true even in those countries where the Convention forms
part of domestic law. 41 Such decisions also do not constitute a
40. European Communities Act 1972, § 3(1):
For the purpose of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or effect
of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning and effect of any Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the
European Court, be for determination as such in accordance with the principles
laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court).
41. See A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28, at 260-61. See generally Bossuyt, The
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form of "judicial review" in the usual sense. The Court does not
normally pronounce directly on the compatibility of a municipal
law with the Convention; still less could it declare such a law
invalid. The Court, at least in cases originating in applications
by individuals, decides whether the rights of the individual, as
enunciated in the Convention, have been infringed.
But of course the Court's rulings on the interpretation of the
Convention do have force beyond the confines of the instant
case. Often they demonstrate that a particular statutory provision, not directly in issue before it, does violate the Convention.
The state courts may often conclude correctly that continued
application of the provisions in the prior fashion will inevitably
lead to a finding of a violation of the Convention. Is it not then
their duty to avoid applying those provisions?
Yet, in the present state of English judicial attitudes, this view
must have its limits. Even where the Court's judgment clearly
found a United Kingdom statute inconsistent with the Convention, no English court would accept the argument that it should
not apply that statute; the court would feel bound to wait until
Parliament had amended or repealed the statute. Nonetheless,
several factors should compel English courts to strive to give effect to the Convention. First, under international law, a decision
contrary to the Convention would be an immediate violation.
This provides a further argument for saying that faithful compliance with the Convention may require giving direct effect to
its provisions, as interpreted by the Court. Second, European
Community law provides a parallel. The Court of Justice has
adopted, in the Simmenthal case, the federal doctrine that a
state court must set aside, and refuse to apply, any provision of
State law which conflicts with Community law. 42 (English courts,
when confronted with that issue, may one day accept the Simmenthal doctrine.) Third, at least in those countries where the
Convention is part of domestic law, it is possible to argue that
the courts may not apply domestic legislation so as to be inconsistent with the judgments of the Court. Fourth, the English
courts, if they cannot fly in the face of an Act of Parliament,
must do their best to reconcile its terms with the United Kingdom's international obligations. If the courts persist in applying
an Act in circumstances which are likely to lead to an adverse
Direct Applicability of International Instruments on Human Rights, 15 REVUE BELGE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 317, 323-25 (1980) (discussing the effects of a decision by the
European Court of Human Rights that the Convention supercedes conflicting national
laws).
42. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629.
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ruling by the Court of Human Rights, then they engage the international responsibility of the United Kingdom.
In practice, courts may avoid conflict between United Kingdom statutes and the Court's rulings if the English judges are
prepared to apply legislation in the light of judgments of the
Court. The case of Attorney-General u. British Broadcasting
Corporation, 43 where the question of contempt of court arose after the Court had given judgment in the Sunday Times 44 case,
but before the United Kingdom legislation had been amended
by the Contempt of Court Act 1981, presented such an opportunity. In Attorney-General u. British Broadcasting Corporation,
Lord Fraser acknowledged that the courts should give consideration to the provisions of the Convention and to decisions of the
Court of Human Rights in cases where the domestic law is not
firmly settled·. 411 Lord Scarman appeared to go further, implying
that, even when a decision of the House of Lords had established English law, the House should be prepared to reconsider
its decision in the light of the Convention and Court decisions
applying the Convention. 46
Very recently the English courts have once again shown a
more positive, yet still hesitant, attitude towards the Convention. Several recent House of Lords decisions on freedom of expression exemplify the new tendency. Attorney-General u. British Broadcasting Corporation is one example. The Lemon case47
in 1979, the first prosecution for blasphemous libel in more than
fifty years, also demonstrates this new tendency. Mrs. Mary
Whitehouse, a well-known self-appointed custodian of public
morality, brought a private suit against the editor of Gay News
who published a poem describing homosexual acts performed on
the body of the crucified Christ. The common law offence of
blasphemous libel has an uncertain scope. The House of Lords
addressed the specific question of whether the prosecution had
to prove an intent to blaspheme or only an intent to publish
material that was blasphemous. Lord Scarman, among the majority of three to two, relying on the European Convention, considered that an intent to publish was sufficient. 48 Freedom of religion, in his view, outweighed freedom of expression. Lord
Diplock, on the other hand, without expressly adverting to the
43. 1981 A.C. 303 (H.L.).
44. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979).
45. 1981 A.C. 303, 352 (1980) (H.L.) (Lord Fraser).
46. Id. at 354 (Lord Scarman).
47. Regina v. Lemon, 1979 A.C. 617 (H.L.).
48. Id. at 665 (Lord Scarman).
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Convention, considered that the majority view would, in effect,
make blasphemy an offence of strict liability and that such a
retrograde step could not be justified by any considerations of
public policy. 49
A few months later, Lord Diplock took a similar view, this
time expressly relying on the Convention, in a case of defamatory libel again arising out of a private prosecution. Gleaves v.
Deakin, 60 which concerned evidence given before a magistrate
about the bad reputation of the prosecutor, led the courts to
consider the rule of English criminal law that the truth of the
defamatory statement is not a defence to a charge of defamatory
libel. Lord Diplock could find no justification for the rule in the
Convention. He suggested that in order to
avoid the risk of our failing to comply with our international obligations under the European Convention, . . .
the consent of the Attorney-General [should be required
before a] prosecution for criminal libel [is instituted, and
that in] deciding whether to grant his consent in the particular case, the Attorney-General could then consider
whether the prosecution was necessary on any of the
grounds specified in Article 10.2 of the Convention and
unless satisfied that it was, he should refuse his
consent. 61
If the courts suggest that the discretion to prosecute should

not be exercised in such a case, it seems a short step to say that,
if there is a prosecution, the courts should not convict. This recalls Professor Weiler's point that one effect of a Bill of Rights
may be to transfer an issue from the area of prosecutor's discretion to the area of judicial review. 62
Perhaps the most significant recent case concerning English
courts' treatment of the Convention is Malone v. Commissioner
of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2) in 1979. 63 Malone, a dealer in
antiques, was charged with handling stolen property. During his
trial, prosecuting counsel admitted that the police had tapped
his telephone with the authorisation of the Home Secretary, to
obtain evidence against him. In proceedings against the police
49. Id. at 635-39 (Lord Diplock).
50. 1980 A.C. 477 (H.L. 1979).
51. Id. at 482 (Lord Diplock).
52. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 72-73 (1984).
53. 1979 Ch. 344.
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challenging the legality of the police practice Malone relied on
Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to respect for private life and correspondence. Because English law
provides no general right of privacy, the judge's reaction acquires particular significance. He stated at the outset of a very
careful discussion of the relation of the Convention and English
law 54 that he was prepared to take account of the Convention
and of the interpretation adopted by the Court of Human
Rights in the Klass case, 55 in which the Court had stated that
such interception of communications was permissible only if accompanied by stringent legal safeguards. In Malone the English
court acknowledged that if a question of statutory construction
existed, the court would readily seek to construe the legislation
in a way that would give effect to, rather than frustrate, the
Convention. But in the absence of any legislation, it could not
give effect to the Convention. "Any regulation of so complex a
matter as telephone tapping is essentially a matter for Parliament, not the courts; and neither the convention nor the Klass
case can, I think, play any proper part in deciding the issue
before me. " 56
This judgment contains a number of striking features. First,
Malone presents the clearest recognition that English law is not
in accordance with the Convention. Not only was there no general protection of privacy under English law; it was clear to the
court, from the Klass case, that the Court of Human Rights
would find that English law violated the Convention.
[I]t is impossible to read the judgment in the Klass case
without it becoming abundantly clear that a system
which has no legal safeguards whatever has small chance
of satisfying the requirements of that court, whatever administrative provisions there may be [and that it is] impossible to see how English law could be said to satisfy
the requirements of the Convention, as interpreted in the
Klass case . . . . 57
The Malone opinion effectively torpedoes the view, if it was ever
tenable, that incorporation of the Convention is unnecessary because English law already gives the Convention full effect. Not
54.
55.
1978).
56.
57.

Id. ai 366.
Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 214 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights
Malone, 1979 Ch. at 380.
Id. at 379-80.
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surprisingly, the case has now been referred to the European
Court of Human Rights.
Second, the case provides an interesting indication, of some
general importance, of why the traditional common law approach to the protection of civil liberties is no longer adequate.
That approach is based on the idea that anything which is not
prohibited is permitted; therefore, no need exists for any instrument expressly conferring individual rights. (This idea contrasts
with the approach of less favoured countries in which everything
not expressly permitted is prohibited.) Yet the Malone case
stands the principle on its head. Because everything is permitted
except that which is expressly prohibited, telephone tapping is
not unlawful.
Third, a curious paradox follows from the failure to incorporate the Convention; a matter regulated by English law can be
treated in accordance with the Convention, while in the absence
of any relevant domestic law the Convention cannot be invoked
at all. This paradox appears in the judge's approach in Malone.
The judge states that he will give the Convention due consideration in discussing English law on the point, yet when he comes
to the point and finds no English law, he considers himself unable to apply the Convention.
English judges, however, no longer always regard the absence
of legislation as a reason for not intervening. The House of
Lords has experienced a fundamental change of attitude over
the past twenty years. The 1960's witnessed a legal as well as a
social turning point in England. As the study of The Law Lords
by Alan Paterson, 58 based on an extensive series of interviews,
documents in fascinating detail, "for the first time the Law
Lords as a body began to discuss judicial law-making and policy
issues openly in a series of cases." 59 Concomitantly, fundamental
changes were made in the judicial law-making functions: the rule
that the House of Lords was bound by its own decisions was
within limits overturned; a more purposive approach was
adopted to legislation and even to treaties; and, in particular,
the fact that Parliament had not legislated was removed as a
reason for judges to maintain the status quo. The argument
from parliamentary inactivity found favour with few of the Law
Lords interviewed as a reason for judicial restraint. Lord Denning replied with characteristic candour:
58.
59.

A.

PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS

Id. at 154.

(1982).
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Well, we use it when it suits our book.
I use it if I
don't want it altered, but, on the other hand if it doesn't
suit our book, I can say, "Oh, well, Parliament can't notice everything and doesn't notice everything and they
haven't got time to do it." 60
Certainly, Parliamentary inactivity has many causes other
than satisfaction with the existing law; this points to a fourth
lesson from the Malone case. Ordinary legislation constitutes an
inadequate substitute for a Bill of Rights because Parliament
will legislate only under extreme pressure. As a leading authority
on the subject, Professor Harry Street, has said in this context,
"the Englishman who is the victim of abuse of this tapping
power remains without remedy in English courts. Not until the
European Court forces a change ... is a United Kingdom Government likely to improve his lot."61 And again in the same context, Professor Street has commented that "one of the dominant
characteristics of British Governments is that they resist any legal restrictions on the exercise of their powers: at all costs they
will do no more than make ex gratia concessions of no legal effect."62 Yet the courts' new approach points the way to a new
approach to the Convention. The absence of legislation giving
effect to the Convention could, with an additional but limited
stretch of the judicial imagination, be discounted as a reason for
disregarding its provisions. The judges could fill the legislative
lacuna.
Another new strand in the argument derives from the complex
interrelationship between English law, the Convention, and European Community law. While European Community law has
and the Convention has not been given the force of statutory law
in the United Kingdom, the Convention does have a certain status in European Community law. The Court of Justice of the
European Communities has increasingly, over the past ten years,
acknowledged that the principle of respect for fundamental
rights forms part of the general principles of law that must be
observed in the application of Community law. 63 These general
principles include such fundamental axioms as the principles of
non-discrimination and proportionality, as well as respect for individual rights. In relation to individual rights, however, the
60. Id. at 181.
61. H. STREET, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 52 (5th ed. 1982).
62. Id. at 53.
63. See Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 Y.B. EUR.
L. 125; A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28, at 229-59.
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Convention, together with constitutional principles of the member States, serve merely as material sources of those general
principles. The Convention would be a formal source of Community law only if the Court were to take the further step of holding that the Convention binds the Community or if the Community itself were to accede to the Convention, as has been
officially proposed. 64 And even if the Convention were to become
part of Community law and thereby become capable of being
invoked in the English courts, it could be invoked only in relation to Community measures and not in relation to English law
at large.
But the argument does not stop there. Because the Court relies on the Convention as evidence of the general principles of
law, the courts of the member States can already rely on the
Convention in the same capacity when the state authorities apply a Community provision. They, therefore, must consider the
Convention. Whatever the status of the Convention in English
law, the English courts are not only permitted, but are required,
to consider it if it should be relevant to an issue of Community
law. They must interpret Community measures as would the
Court of Justice. 65 Here, again, the picture has changed. The
Convention has become a source of a supranational European
law and as such has some application in the legal systems of all
the member States of the Community.
It is difficult to see why there should not be some spillover
from the general principles of law into other areas outside the
field of Community legislation. Why should English courts adopt
one approach in reviewing the conduct of public authorities
where the authorities are applying Community law and a different approach where the same authorities, in a related field, are
applying domestic legislation? Immigration officers must apply
the Community rules on free movement in accordance with the
Convention: why not also the domestic rules? Even in the short
term such judicial schizophrenia seems unsatisfactory. In the
longer term, just as the courts in the past adopted the rules of
customary international law, and a common commercial law, the
courts may also recognise the emergence of European customary
64. The proposal by the Commission of the European Communities that the Community should accede to the Convention was published in Memorandum of Apr. 4, 1979,
BULL. EUR. COl\_1M. (Supp. 1979-80) (No. 2/79). See HousE OF LORDS, SELECT COMMITTEE
ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS (1979-80 H.L. 362); McBride & Brown,

The United Kingdom, the European Community and the European Convention on
Human Rights, l Y.B. EuR. L. 167, 176-92 (F. Jacobs ed. 1981).
65. European Communities Act 1972, § 3(1). See supra note 40.
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law, a common core of general principles of general application.
European Community law supports the application of the
Convention in three further ways. First, the history of application of European Community law helps to dispose of the argument that the provisions of the Convention are too general and
too vague to be enforceable. The provisions of the Community
Treaties are also often framed in a very general way. For example, the EEC Treaty provisions on competition, Articles 85 and
86, the common market anti-trust law, present such broad provisions. Article 86 prohibits any abuse of a dominant position in a
substantial part of the common market. Although the examples
of abuse listed in Article 86 and the case-law of the Court of
Justice create some specificity, the basic concepts remain remarkably porous and open-textured. Yet the courts enforce the
prohibition of Article 86, and do so in cases requiring both findings on complex questions of fact and an evaluation of problematical economic issues, which may tax the courts more seriously
than the application of the Convention in cases of fundamental
rights. Generality is no longer an excuse.
Second, ten years' experience in the handling of Community
law demonstrates that Parliamentary sovereignty is not the
stumbling-block it might, and did, seem. The courts, untroubled
by theoretical constitutional issues, have accustomed themselves
to the primacy of Community law. Only if an Act of Parliament
expressly purported to override Community law would that difficulty be real; although such an eventuality cannot be excluded
altogether, it is perhaps even less likely that an express overriding of the Convention would prove necessary.
Third, the Community Treaties constitute the only European
example, apart from the Convention, of procedures for international judicial determination of the rights of individuals against
states. Because the very object and purpose of the Convention,
in comparison with the Community Treaties, is to accord the individual enforceable rights, there can be no warrant for giving
less effect to the Convention than to the Community Treaties.
The existence of judicial interpretation also assists in disposing of the argument that the courts, in interpreting an Act of
Parliament consistently with the Convention, are doing no more
than giving effect to the intention of Parliament. That argument, designed to reconcile the international obligations of the
United Kingdom with the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty,
is when applied to the Convention exposed as a fiction. Taken
strictly, the argument would be difficult to apply to Acts of Parliament enacted before ratification of the Convention, because it
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is difficult to contend that Parliament did not then intend to
legislate inconsistently with the Convention. 66 But it becomes
impossible to reconcile with an evolving interpretation of the
Convention by the Court of Human Rights. The true explanation must be found in the principle, also correct under international law, that all organs of the State, the courts as well as the
legislature, are bound by treaty obligations. And in the special
case of the Convention, the obligations are to be interpreted in
accordance with the judgments of the Court.
If Parliament decided to adopt a Bill of Rights-and here it
must be said that a decision is not much closer than it was ten
years ago-should it be the Convention or a tailor-made Bill,
more suited to domestic conditions, perhaps even fuller and
more up-to-date than the Convention? In my view, a number of
arguments, individually strong and cumulatively overwhelming,
support the adoption of the Convention as the text of a United
Kingdom Bill of Rights. 67 Some of the arguments also demonstrate that incorporation of the Convention would overcome obstacles which would otherwise attend the adoption of a Bill of
Rights.
First, legal obligation compels at least partial incorporation of
the Convention. Courts cannot now give full effect to the United
Kingdom's Convention obligations without some form of incorporation of that text.
Second, there is the weighty practical consideration that the
Convention commands a wide measure of cross-party support. It
would be difficult if not impossible to achieve a similar measure
of consensus on a new Bill of Rights. The difficulties of drafting
a new Bill of Rights can hardly be overstated. The exercise
would open up a veritable Pandora's box of political controversy,
which could take years to resolve, with no certainty of a successful outcome.
Third, a new Bill of Rights would raise problems of overlapping provisions. The coexistence of a new Bill of Rights, directly
enforceable, and an indirectly enforceable Convention would be
a recipe for confusion, if not chaos.
Fourth, there is the European dimension: incorporation of the
Convention would achieve the adoption of a common European
standard at a stroke of the legislative pen.
66. See Duffy, English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585, 591-93 (1980).
67. I note, but do not find convincing, Jaconelli's objections to adoption of the Convention. See J. JACONELLI, supra note 33, at 277-81.
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Fifth, a new Bill of Rights would deprive the courts of the
guidance of the Strasbourg case-law. Experience shows that the
courts would have genuine difficulties in coping with constitutional style provisions. If, on the other hand, the Bill of Rights
were drafted in greater detail, in a style to which the courts are
accustomed, it would lose the advantages of flexibility, adaptability and permanence, and would perhaps encourage a narrow
approach to its interpretation. One leading advocate of a Bill of
Rights, Anthony Lester, has warned that it might take years to
persuade the courts not to approach a Bill of Rights in the same
way they approach a taxing statute. 68 Such a danger is obviated,
in the case of the Convention, by the availability of the Strasbourg case law.
Sixth, and perhaps of greatest importance, the Convention
would provide the required balance between Parliament and the
courts and go far to resolve the central dilemma which is the
principal theme of the debate: the role of judicial review in a
democratic society. The overt intrusion of the courts into politics, and the spectre of political appointments of judges, raise
particular difficulties in the United Kingdom. The Convention
has successfully maintained the balance between the effective
protection of human rights and the preservation of political consensus. Its acceptability in so many European democracies
would both reassure those who genuinely regard any dilution of
Parliamentary sovereignty as undemocratic and also provide a
measure of protection for the courts. It would minimize what in
the United Kingdom may be seen to be the greatest risks attendant on the introduction of a Bill of Rights: the twin dangers
of judicial interference in the political process and the possibility of political interference with the independence of the
judiciary.
But I have sought to suggest that, even without legislation and
quite apart from any general arguments about the desirability of
adopting a Bill of Rights, the United Kingdom courts can and
should currently give full effect to the Convention. This may not
be an entirely satisfactory alternative to formal incorporation of
the Convention by Act of Parliament. Such incorporation could
put the Convention on a firmer legal basis; it would have a valuable declaratory and promotional effect; and it might even, by
68. A. Lester, DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1969) (Fabian Tract No. 390),
cited in J. JACONELLI, supra note 33, at 178. For the most recent contribution to the
debate, see Lester, Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated?, 1984 PuB. L.
46.
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analogy with the European Communities Act, give the Convention some special status without formal entrenchment.
It has to be accepted that full entrenchment is not at present
a realistic option. Full entrenchment would be difficult without a
wholly new. constitutional settlement, which is normally a response to political crisis and renovation, as is underscored by the
examples of the United States, Caneda, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and indeed by the Magna Carta and the 1689 Bill of
Rights. In the United Kingdom today, however, the customary
lack of interest in our constitutional arrangements, and even less
interest in constitutional theory, remains pervasive. Additionally, no widespread view exists that fundamental rights are inadequately protected. Every society has its blind spots; and in the
United Kingdom there is a blindness to all issues of constitutional principle, the product, no doubt-for it was not always
so-of a long period of political stability and the absence of dissatisfaction with the existing level of protection of human rights.
But entrenchment of a Bill of Rights may not be a pressing
need, even if the present state of the law is recognised as unsatisfactory. Even incorporation of the Convention by ordinary legislation, although desirable, need not be treated as indispensable. The courts could do much to fill the legislative gap and to
give effect to the Convention: by construing other legislation restrictively; by following the example of the Court of Human
Rights in giving fundamental rights a broad interpretation and
scrutinizing rigorously the justification for all restrictions; by applying the principles of necessity and proportionality; by developing judicial remedies even in the absence of legislation; and by
drawing attention forcefully to what may prove to be the rare
cases where an Act of Parliament by its terms leaves them no
choice but to ignore the Convention.
.
It is striking to look back ten years to a time when the Convention was almost unknown in the United Kingdom and had
never been cited in a judicial decision. In the past decade, the
interpretation of the Convention has made great advances and a
substantial European law of human rights has developed. Will
the next decade see similar advances? By giving effect, de facto,
to the Convention, the United Kingdom courts could bring the
United Kingdom into step with other European countries, with
many Commonwealth countries, and with other democratic societies committed to the effective protection of human rights. The
courts could develop, over the forthcoming years, on the basis of
the Convention, a new Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom.

